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ВНЕСОК ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОГО СОЮЗУ У РЕФОРМУ ЦИВІЛЬНОГО СЕКТОРУ БЕЗПЕКИ В УКРАЇНІ ПІСЛЯ 2014 РОКУ

EUROPEAN UNION'S CONTRIBUTION TO CIVILIAN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN UKRAINE AFTER 2014

Анотація. *У статті розглядаються шляхи того, як Спільна політика безпеки та оборони Європейського Союзу сприяє миру та стабільності в Україні. Починаючи з 2014 року, після Євромайдану та його вимог до європеїзації країни, ЄС та інші міжнародні організації допомагають Україні в її модернізаційних зусиллях. Поширення жорстокого військового конфлікту на Сході України вимагало багатостороннього залучення стратегічних партнерів у трансформації секторів безпеки та оборони, а також активної участі в управлінні конфліктами у східній частині країни. ЄС брав участь у різних ініціативах, пропонованих державами-членами, Спільнотою та Україною. У статті йдеться про те, чи були використані ті інструменти, які складають суть СПБО (Спільна політика безпеки та оборони), та наскільки вигідні ці зусилля для України. У статті також досліджено, які ініціативи СПБО можуть сприяти трансформації сектору безпеки в Україні та які основні комунікаційні канали використовуються для пояснення реформ.*

Співпрацю України з ЄС розглянуто в історичному контексті. Автори звертають увагу на те, що перші механізми для співпраці з колишніми республіками Радянського Союзу Європейський Союз запропонував ще в 1994 р. Йдеться про програми «TACIS» («Технічна допомога для СНД») і «TEMPUS» (схема співпраці між країнами ЄС і країнами-партнерами в галузі вищої освіти), які Україна використала частково. Розглянуто також співпрацю України з ЄС у межах Консультативної місії Європейського Союзу (EUAM) в Україні, метою якої було сприяння трансформації сектору цивільної безпеки.

Стаття наводить короткий огляд інструментів, які ЄС має у своєму розпорядженні для співпраці з іншими країнами в секторі цивільної безпеки. Розглянуто результати роботи ЄС в Україні після 2014 року, коли Консультативна місія Європейського Союзу в Україні почала діяти. Наведено перелік питань, які варто розглянути в майбутньому.

Ключові слова: *Спільна політика безпеки та оборони, Європейський Союз, Консультативна місія Європейського Союзу, реформа сектору безпеки, стабілізаційні зусилля.*

Abstract. *The article looks at ways on how Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union are contributing to peace and stability in Ukraine. Since 2014, after the Euromaidan and its demands for Europeanization of the country, the EU and other international donors are assisting Ukraine in its modernization efforts. The spread of violent military conflict in Eastern Ukraine required multilateral engagement of strategic partners in transformation of security and defence sectors, as well as active participation in conflict management in the Eastern part of the country. EU was taking part in various initiatives offered by member states, the Community itself, and Ukraine. The article questions whether those instruments, which constitute the essence of CSDP, have been utilized, and how*

beneficial those efforts were for Ukraine. The article also explores what improvements in the implementation of CSDP could enhance transformation of security sector in Ukraine and what are the main communication channels used to explain the reforms.

Cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union was considered in a historical aspect. The authors emphasize that the first mechanisms for cooperation with the former Soviet Union republics were proposed by the European Union in 1994. These are the TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) and the TEMPUS (Trans-European Mobility Programme for University Studies) programmes that Ukraine has used in part. Ukraine's cooperation with the EU within the framework of the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine, the aim of which was facilitating the transformation of the civil security sector, was also considered.

The article gives an overview of the tools that the European Union has at its disposal to work with other countries in the civil security sector. The results of the work of the EU in Ukraine after 2014, when the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine was launched, are analyzed. A list of issues to consider in the future is given.

Keywords: *Common Security and Defence Policy, European Union, European Union Advisory Mission, security sector reform, stabilization efforts.*

Introduction. Relations between the European Union (EU) and Ukraine go back to the beginning of 1990s when countries breaking free from the communist regime were willing to introduce democratic regimes and follow the path of western values. At that time, the EU together with Transatlantic partners were embracing Ukrainian efforts in transformation of economic, political and societal structures. The breakdown of the Soviet Union clearly indicated that its former «republics» were willing to restore independence. However, at that time, the countries decided to pursue two different paths: one was chosen by the three Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuanian, claiming that their foreign and security policy priorities are linked to the EU and NATO, and full membership in these organizations is the only policy option guaranteeing irreversibility of independence and autonomy in international affairs; the second policy path was preferred by other post-soviet entities, namely, utilization of existing ties and interdependencies present since the previous historical period, thus in short term ensuring the so-called soft transition to democratic regime (while the Baltic States took much harder approach – cutting-off ties with the remains of the soviet regime) and opening themselves for closer cooperation with international partners. The second model to very large extent was based on the existing networks of political elites, bureaucracy, and patterns of behaviour.

Results and discussion. During those first years of modernization, EU offered several frameworks for cooperation, such as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1994, TACIS, TEMPUS and other programmes. But since Ukraine did not use those instruments as drivers for EU membership, the country became trapped between its strive for new identity of being an independent country and only partly transformed its economic, political, security and defence, and social sectors. Even the Orange revolution in 2004 did not change the path of Europeanization efforts – the pace and efficiency of implementing the reforms was slow and fragmented. Therefore, in 2014, when at that time,

president Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement [1], thus undermining Ukraine's irreversible path to Europeanization, massive protests known as Euromaidan were launched in the centre of Kyiv. Spread of violence followed by military conflict in Eastern Ukraine, revealed that security and defence sectors were not fully operational indicating different weakneses existing in these sectors.

The EU on its side was taking an active role in mitigating, negotiating and supporting transformative efforts after Euromaidan. One of the very unique initiatives was the establishment of European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) [2] in Ukraine with the clear mandate to assist in transforming civilian security sector [See: Note 1]. The EUAM Ukraine was launched in 2014. Five years after EU's active engagement in civilian security sector reform it is possible to assess the first outcomes and indicate what challenges the both parties could face in future. The research question the article intends to answer is whether the EU's efforts in assisting the modernization of civilian security sector will deliver tangible outcomes? Whether those efforts can be considered efficient? Whether they are teaching any lessons for improving EU's engagement in other missions? The article will start with a short overview of instruments which the EU has at its disposal in the third countries as far as civilian security sector in concerned. The second section will look at the EU's performance in Ukraine after 2014 when the EUAM became operational. The final part will approach some of the issues that should be considered in the future.

I. What the European Union can offer for its partners in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Foreign and Defence Policy?

The EU became an agent of the foreign and security policy in 1993 when an already existing package of EU's activities on the international stage was incorporated in the Maastricht Treaty [3], thus defining the mission, mandate and operational settings. However, the policy under the abbreviation CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) was modest on the implementation

side due to intergovernmental character of the policy, where national interests were prevailing. The external pressure caused by the war in former Yugoslavia and the dissolution of the Soviet Union also contributed to confusion existing within the CFSP framework. EU was demonstrating signs of pursuing «common» policies as far as military dimensions of the conflicts were not concerned. Although, EU's reaction towards newly established / restored independent states demonstrated support and commitment to assist them in their transitional efforts. These were actions mostly falling into the category «foreign», rather to «security».

The situation changed in 1998 after bilateral summit between French and UK's political leaders in Saint Malo when Jack Shirak and Tony Blair agreed to put forward a more stronger and effective security and defence policy initiative [4], one which could increase EU's global presence and ensure its contribution to peace and stability in the region, as well as internationally. The new policy initiative − European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) was based on more coordinated and coherent approach to security and defence policy. In order to achieve the defined goals the EU committed itself to the Helsinki Headline goals [5]. The evolution of ESDP was taking place at a very rapid pace, starting from the first European Security Strategy [6], followed by the creation of Battle groups, and backed by institutional and financial arrangements.

The EU's commitment to undertake more responsibility and engagement in world affairs was demonstrated by adopting European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 [7], where Ukraine was identified as one of the beneficiaries of the policy. Despite the ambiguity of the ENP such security related policies as CFSP and CSDP played only marginal role. As it was indicated by a group of international scholars studying EU's contribution to crisis management in Ukraine «... less than a third of the EU's CSDP missions abroad have been deployed in the neighbourhood region illustrates this» [8, p. 8]. Since the ENP embraced many countries with diverse policy interests and demands, it was clear that policies of those countries vis-a vis the EU, as well as interests of member states in the neighbourhood will be a complex of interests, which will hamper the implementation of the defined goals and policy plans. Among member states such as Poland, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which are more exposed to the eastern border of the EU, concerns about efficiency of the ENP were raised. It was obvious that such countries as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine [See: Note 2] were pursuing Europeanization policy, which could culminate in application for EU membership and it would require more attention and efforts in support to modernization process in those countries. As a result of the above

mentioned considerations, Poland and Sweden jointly proposed to EU member states the Eastern Partnership initiative ensuring constant and resolve EU presence and involvement in Europeanization process of these countries on the basis of new foundations [9]. Thus, Ukraine was put on EU's political priorities' map obtaining a «ring of friends» among 28 member states.

The new impetus to expanded security and defence policy was given by the adoption of the Lisbon treaty, which renamed ESDP in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) [10], which was supported by numerous institutional and organizational novelties, including the creation of the European External Action Service, which was assigned to implement decisions related to CSDP missions and operations.

After the problematic EU summit in Vilnius, the so-called Eastern Partnership summit, in 2013 [See: Note 3], when Ukraine and Armenia rejected signing of Association Agreements with the EU, mass demonstrations began in Ukraine with clear support to Europeanization of the country, leading to violent actions from security forces and many deaths of civilians. Consequent illegal annexation of Crimea and spread of war in the Eastern Ukraine demonstrated that Ukraine and also the EU found themselves in a different political reality that they expected. Therefore, EU policy towards Ukraine was re-designed based on an urgent need for modernization of areas stagnating due to corruption, oligarhization and state capture. The inherited governance model corresponded and served the needs of the post-soviet elite, which, in order to preserve status quo, for decades had rejected reforms based on good governance principles. In general, Ukraine found itself trapped in status quo that could no longer been continued. Thus, reforms related to good governance were expected to be designed and delivered in all levels of governance as well as in policy sectors. So, well known principles of rule of law, accountability and transparency were among those to be inherited in the everyday setting. In order to define relations between different levels of governance, Ukraine started the process of decentralisation as part of the country`s democratisation process by setting up exclusive responsibilities of each level of governance. Meanwhile, in order to ensure further irreversibility of the achievements, it was essential to sustain a momentum of changes regarding rule of law to ensure superioty of law and following trust of citizens instead of serving the needs of the post-soviet elite. It required considerable efforts in all policy areas to start to implement changes in attitude and working practice of administratiors shifting from service the elite to service citizens for common benefits. Almost all problems inherited or created after the beginning of 1990s also reflected in the security sector − military and civilian.

An additional policy component that the EU added to the list of existing policy tools in 2016 was the adoption of the EU Global Strategy [11], identifying the main areas of interests, priorities and goals. The Strategy contains a strong emphasis on EU's regional efforts and enhancement of crisis management capabilities that could serve also interests of Ukraine.

Summing up, starting from 1993, the EU has accumulated substantial resources, which could contribute to stability and peace in the countries which require international involvement either before, during, or after crisis or conflicts. Those resources are — 1) more than 40 000 diplomats employed by the EEAS — multinational diplomatic corps to be placed globally, 10 000 police officers ready for deployment, the largest development budget in the world, experience in supporting state-building process in different regions of the world, CSDP missions and operations defined [See: Note 4]; 2) Areas of specialization become clearer, the so called niche capabilities are specified — policing; rule of law; support of civil administration and security sector reform and monitoring; recent challenges as migration, terrorism and organized crime promoted debates on active and effective utilization of FRONTEX; 3) Several important policy decisions and initiatives related to security and defence policy were adopted by the EU, such as - European Defence Fund [12] was launched, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) [13] format allows countries to pursue joint projects; Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) [14] process is introduced; Joint Declaration on EU-NATO strategic partnership of 2016 [15] is crucial for enhancing EU crisis management capabilities; Civilian CSDP Compact (CCC) [16], which was proposed in 2018, identified 22 political commitments to be implemented by 2023. Among them are such areas as a) countering organized crime; b) supporting border management; c) countering terrorism and violent extremism; d) addressing irregular migration; e) supporting maritime security; f) hybrid threats and cyber security; e) protecting cultural heritage [16].

In the next part of the article the authors will explore how previously described EU's security and defence policy instruments are applied in Ukraine and what are the first results.

II. EU and Ukraine: civilian security sector reform efforts. After Ukraine's decisive decision to pursue the EU integration policy and willingness to sign Association Agreement and followed by Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) [17], the EU offered assistance in support of the civilian security sector reform by opening EU Advisory Mission Ukraine in 2014 [18]. However, it should be mentioned that even before 2014 EU and Ukraine established collaboration regarding security sector. Ukrainian researcher Kateryna Zarembo provides a good account of different activities taking place over the years. She mentions such as signed «Permanent Security Agreement on the exchange of classified information with the EU in 2005. In March 2008 the Verkhovna Rada ratified the EU Ukraine Agreement, thus establishing a framework for Ukraine's participation in EU crisis management operations. Ukraine has a good record of alignment with EU common diplomatic positions. According to a report presented by Ukraine's cabinet, in March 2010, it has aligned itself with 90 percent of common EU positions. … Ukraine is … the only Eastern partner, which contributes to the EU's ongoing missions and operations. Ukraine is engaged in the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the ATALANTA mission combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. On the 1st of July 2011, the Ukrainian Naval Forces joined the Greek-led European Union Battle Group HELBROC on a six month stand-by duty. Ukraine is the third country after Turkey and Norway to send its troops to the military group of the Union» [19].

In the mission statement of the EUAM [18] it is clearly underlined that security of the country and its citizens is a responsibility of the state, which has an obligation to decide on laws, rules and regulations to be implemented by respective law-enforcement agencies [See: Note 5]. Meanwhile, EU's role is based on mutually agreed assistance efforts, which be implemented by the country itself.

At the same time, EU has identified main areas of concerns, which require joint human, financial ,and technical investments. EU claims that «…Ukraine lacks a strategic approach to the sector as a whole, and individual civilian security sector strategies. … The Ukrainian government has taken some positive steps towards the reforms, and clearly outlined its reform priorities in areas such as anti-corruption, police, and the judicial system. However, low level of public trust in the political, law-enforcement and judicial systems is evidence that much more needs to be done before the expectations of the Ukrainian public are met» [18]. EU, on its side, talks about comprehensive, systemic, reform «… integrating cross-cutting issues such as anti-corruption, good governance, and human rights and gender» [18].

One of the values of the EUAM is that the mission functions not only in Kyiv but also in Lviv, Kharkiv, and Odessa, supported by two mobile units. Total budget available for different actions is 54 million euro as from 1st of June 2019 — 31st of May 2021, which is increased by 25% [20]. The staff is composed of 157 Ukrainians and 138 internationals [See: Note 6], 25 Member States contribute to the Mission and Canada [21] is one of the engaged parties as well.

In order to offer the assessment of the EUAM after five years of performance it is necessary to look at the mandate that was agreed by member states and further implemented by the mission. The mandate of the Mission composed of three main areas − «Strategic advice on civilian security sector reform to develop civilian security sector strategies; Support the implementation of reforms hands-on advice, training, projects; Cooperation and coordination to ensure that reform efforts are coordinated with Ukrainian and international actors» [21]. Consequently based on the mandate, «five priorities were agreed upon − 1) human resource management; 2) criminal investigation; 3) public order; 4) community policing; 5) delineation of competences» [22]. It is important to underline that the EU's proposed comprehensive approach presupposes incorporation of cross-cutting issues into priority areas, such as human rights and gender, good governance and anti-corruption [22].

The EUAM in its documents is providing a very detailed assessment of the achieved results and critical issues. While appreciating such achievements as prioritization of reform areas − anti-corruption, the police and the judicial system [See: Note 7], the Mission reminds, that «there are numerous challenges that hinder the reform of the civilian security sector, such as unwillingness and resistance to change, gaps in legislation, insufficient funding, unsatisfactory professional standards, a lack of coordination between agencies, and the prevalence of corruption» [23].

III. Case study. In order to present a more detailed picture of the EU's contribution to the civilian sector reform we looked at implemented projects. With a support of EUAM, the significant contributions were provided to strengthen rule of law, namely to strengthen capacity of the rule enforcement agencies in Ukraine. Thus, with support of EUAM, there were the new drafts laws and strategic documents designed, the new approaches introduced and finally organisational restructuring supported. Numbers speak for themselves − the EUAM provided advise for development of 40 draft laws and 25 strategic documents [23]. It might be assumed that these laws and strategic documents could tailor the new direction towards rule of law and better governance. However, the World Bank governance indicators show a rather different picture. The government effectiveness index reflects the quality of public services and the quality of policy formulation as well as implementation. The rule of law index mirrors to what extent society has confidence in rule of law. Even the four-year period is rather too short to detect the substatntial reform effects, but still changes of the indexes shows some trends. Government effectiveness index is increasing, even the speed is slow. The index of rule of law over the

fouryear period is stable, which means that despite all efforts by the Ukrainina government and international donors, society is still hesitant and still cannot believe that there will be changes with irreversabile actions. Therefore, joint efforts of EUAM and the Ukraining government might be perceived as the scattered initiatives. However, these initiatives to stregthen the civilian security are crucial to show for the whole system that there is a possibility of different behaviour of law enforcement agencies ruining the previous patterns and accepting the new ones.

Chart No. 1.
Government effectiveness and Rule of Law indicators, Ukraine, 2015−2018 [24]

Among many projects, EU provided support for for the newly established administrative service centres under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The EUAM assistance was tailored to draft the strategy and the action plan for the administrative services, along with intensive training of staff to equip them with management and communication skills.

The administrative service centres were introduced in Ukrainian public administration as a part of the customer-oriented approach and decentralization, where each amalgamated community has its modern administrative service centre. The similar trend is also for service delivery in the central agencies and ministries, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The establishment of administrative service centres in the Ministry in not just about faster delivery. It is about the converting the ministry into another religion to change the previous − semi-militarised approach, the one where benefits and security of the community are the primary. In fact, all CEE countries had gone through this stage in 1990s. In the path of public administration reform in CEE, the one institution − the Ministry of Interior always got special attention, because these ministries had been responsible for law enforcement agencies and some local government issues [25, p. 56−72]. Therefore, the

ministries of Interior were usually drivers of reforms in CEE, as law enforcement and rule of law are one of the cornerstones of reforms and goals.

Establishment and training of the service centre in Ministry of Internal Affairs along with supporting operation materials – like service manuals are important contributions for upgrading the services related to registration of vehicles and issuing driver`s licences, receiving certificates of no criminal record etc [26]. As a result of this project, more than one third of staff employed in the service centres were newcomers in around 148 service centres by mid 2017. That means they are not linked with previous administrative culture and thus might be much more open and ready to work under the new standards [27].

Establishment of the service centres under the Ministry of Internal Affairs is a relevant step for customer-oriented focus and better service delivery. However, it should be viewed in the light of the general public administration reform and other service centre initiatives in the local governments and in other policy areas. Whether the step towards better service delivery in the scope of responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs will not lead to vertical coherence in the sector and weak inter-sectoral coordinationis yet to be seen. At the same time, The ministry of Internal affairs in Ukraine has the same strong points as it were for ministries of interior in CEE – extensive administrative experience of staff, links with central and local levels of governance and administrative continuity. Meanwhile, administrative continuity also includes reluctancy and conservatism towards new ideas. Thus, EUAM idea on administrative service centres and the new staff is the point that injects the brand new ideas in the system and minimise the administrative reluctancy.

At the present moment it is possible to present only a tentative assessment of the EUAM contribution to the civilian security sector reform in Ukraine, because the Mission became operational only in 2016, which means that projects have been carried out in a very short time span. However, the institutional setting of the EUAM Ukraine was a complicated process. As it was indicated during the interview with a diplomat working in the EUAM [See: Note 8], setting up the mission was influenced by different opinions among member states about the formulation of the mandate and existing tension between the EU Delegation in Ukraine and the EUAM.

Despite the existence of different international organizations in Ukraine assisting in security sector reform (UN, NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe); the EU was able to identify its specific field of expertise. As Swedish expert Man Hanssen, who has mapped different security sector projects in 2015, identified the following EU's unique projects, which are not offered by other bodies – Anti-Corruption and Accountability, Cyber Security and ICT, Democracy and Human Rights, Gender, Conflict Management, Prevention and Dialogue, Public Management, Parliamentary and Public Oversight, Border Security and Human Trafficking, DDR, SALW and Demining, Justice Reform, Medical Assistance and Equipment, Capacity Development [28].

Mapping exercise also identified that there are differences in EU member states' contribution to the security sector reform. The most active countries are Sweden participating in 7 sectors, the Netherland, France, Germany each in 6, Lithuania – 5, Latvia – 3 and Estonia – 2 [28, p. 12].

After reviewing security projects carried out in Ukraine jointly with international donors Hanssen arrives at conclusions, which demonstrate that in some areas priorities that are agreed upon initially have not been reflected in the projects. For instance, he states that «Gender-responsive security sector reform appears to be limited in Ukraine. There are a few projects that are led or financed by the Council of Europe and OSCE-PCU, which have a focus on gender equality, but a majority of the SSR-related projects lack any reference to gender equality and disaggregated data» [28, p. 18]. Another important conclusion refers to institutions – some receive substantial financial assistance but some are underfinanced and lack international presence. Verkhovan Rada is not actively participating in the security sector reform, while executive bodies are committed and receive systemic support [28, p. 18].

During an interview with a diplomat from the EUAM [See: Note 8], the issue of long and short term priorities and actions was mentioned. From Ukrainian perspective, the EU's contribution is often perceived as slow and not well responsive to the urgent needs of the country. From the public perspective there is a demand for immediate actions and visible results, where solution for the conflict in the Eastern Ukraine is the most pressing and complicated matter. At the same time EUAM's mandate does not include crisis management task and proposed projects. This conclusion was also discussed in Zarembo's article, referring to the situation when Ukrainian side was requesting monitoring missions in Crimea and Donbas, but the EUAM was located in Kyiv [29]. Similar conclusion regarding short and long term measures was made by group scholars in the context of crisis response which can be applicable to civilian security sector as well. They argue that «...actions in Ukraine should offer a long-term strategic vision on issues such as the reintegration and resettlement of internally displaced (IDPs) and the rehabilitation of war veterans» [8, p. 5].

IV. Whether communication matters in reforming civilian security sector?

Communication in the implementation process of different reforms is not a formality requested from the EU or local authorities, but it is a «must». There are at least three reasons behind this. The first is related to the basic principles of democratic countries – people should be aware of economic, political, social and international processes taking place in their respective countries. It allows them to arrive at informed choices and decisions. In this situation communication serves as the process which provides information on relevant issues through a diverse set of channels. The second reason covers the realm of a more specific message – what the particular reform is about and what is the role of each actor in this complicated and difficult endeavour. Within the civilian sector reform messages are delivered by different actors – state, government, EU, NGOs, UN, OSCE, NATO, national and international political leaders. Each of them cover specific areas concerning the civilian security sector, which on the one hand can contribute to the fragmentation of the core message, but on the other hand, if well orchestrated, they can contribute to more coherent, focused and persuasive message about achieved results and also the shortcomings of the reform process. The third reason is related to empowerment of society at large. The public trust in reforms and institutions in charge of implementation processes contributes to societal engagement in the reform. Thus, society being a passive observer of civilian sector reforms can become part of this complicated endeavour. Through participation in the reform process different societal groups strengthen or obtain trust in reforms, transformation of a particular sector and the country in general.

While the role of communication in the implementation of different reforms is not questionable, the chosen channels, core messages and identification of relevant target groups still remain an issue of concern. Communication channels that are used to share information on the state of affairs of reforms are diverse. Both, the EUAM and its liaison ministries heavily rely on information that is placed on their web pages, as well as different types of reports and interviews in media. There are no doubts that there is a lot of information about the initial results of activities performed by the EUAM. However, they mostly focus on the implementation of the EU financed projects but not civilian security reforms at large. Thus, the message about the progress in civilian security sector reforms drowns in the ocean of many small projects. Taking into consideration that the EUAM has a strong regional presence, such an approach to communication contributes further to fragmentation of the core message. Besides, information on the executed projects is not tailor made for each community but follows classical (sometimes out of date) forms of communication approved by the EU bodies. A better identification of local target groups would allow the EU to increase its presence and visibility in the region. It would also build a community of supporters for civilian security reform processes and, thus, in the end increase participation of society in the transformation of the society and the country at large.

Conclusions. The performance of the EUAM Ukraine has taken off and is rapidly accelerating the pace and quality of assistance to the Ukrainian counterpart. At the same time, it is worth paying attention to wider context and identify those processes and factors, which can impact further collaboration of the both parties in achieving substantial progress in reforming civilian security sector.

One of the issues with the impact on reforms in Ukraine is Russia's and EU relations. Since the beginning of Euromaidan, Russia's policy towards Ukraine was demonstrating signs of return to the worst Cold war traditions annexing Crimea, escalating conflict in Eastern Ukraine and interfering into domestic affairs of Ukraine. Russia's unilateral and illegal actions in Ukraine were not tolerated by the EU and sanctions were applied since 2014. With the election of new Ukrainian president – Volodimir Zelensky the issue of Eastern territories and conflict resolution is back on discussion track. In the nearest future there will be different initiatives proposed by the EU and international community [See: Note 9] at large searching for ways to normalize the relations between countries, and largely between Russia and the rest. The challenge for engaged parties will be related to finding solutions which fall into the category of „win-win" solutions, and which will not undermine Ukraine's Europeanization efforts and sovereign paths in domestic and foreign affairs. Both ways – either relations will be improving or escalating, the EUAM will have to adapt to different political environment.

BREXIT could have its footprints on Europeanization. The UK is one of the most active security players in Europe and Transatlantic community at large. The UK's clear stance on Russia and its commitments to support the third countries has been proved by engagement in Ukraine and other states. After leaving the EU the UK will not be part of the CSDP and will have to find new legal arrangements for participation in the EU led missions and operations if such a decision will be made in Brussels and London. There is no doubt that UK will be engaged in the reform process in Ukraine, but it is not clear on what grounds, how fast the new arrangement will become operational, and whether overlaps and duplications will be avoided.

In last couple of years, the EU has initiated numerous policies and actions related to strengthening

so-called Europe's strategic autonomy. There are concerns that «the current initiatives are marginal in comparison to the EU's needs for becoming a flexible, ready, and willing autonomous security and defence actor» [30]. In case if the EU will not instrumentalise embraced policies and initiatives it could have impact on the EUAM and its ability to perform according to strategic ambitions of the Union.

The assessment mechanism of CSDP missions is still in the making. Without clear, transparent, and policy relevant measurement system not being put at place it will be difficult for the EU to improve performance of CSDP missions and operations. It refers also to performance of the EUAM, which has to act in a very complex environment in terms of stakeholders, local agents, political setting, and local and external pressure. Meanwhile, better identification of local target groups would allow the EU to increase its presence and visibility in the region as well as to build a community of supporters for civilian security reform processes.

Following the European elections in 2019 there will be more fragmented European Parliament and new European Commission. It is not clear yet how committed the newly established European bodies will be to Ukraine's transformative efforts and what will be the CSDP focus at large.

Meanwhile, one can pose a question whether Ukraine is able to prioritize its needs in civilian security sector and consequently implement them, and the EU, on its side, able to offer policy instruments that are the most urgent and effective. Seems that both Ukraine and international donors are still searching for the most appropriate forms of cooperation leading to policy outcomes serving the purpose of comprehensive transformation of the country.

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Примітки

Примітка 1. У статті йдеться про участь ЄС у реформі цивільного сектору безпеки після 2014 року. Однак Місія ЄС з прикордонної допомоги в Молдові та Україні присутня в Україні з 2005 року та була продовжена в п'ять разів.

Примітка 2. Інші три країни Східного партнерства − Вірменія, Азербайджан та Білорусь не належать до категорії країн, які прагнуть до членства в ЄС.

Примітка 3. Детальніше про погляди країни перед самітом Вілюса: Інтереси Латвії в Європейському Союзі. 2013 р. (див.: https://www.mfa.gov.lv/images/uploads/ES_3_2013_makets%20netam.pdf).

Примітка 4. У вересні 2019 року ЄС здійснює 16 місій та операцій у всьому світі та працює 5000 осіб.

Примітка 5. У випадку України тими агентами є Міністерство внутрішніх справ, Національна поліція, Державна прикордонна служба, Національне антикорупційне бюро та Служба безпеки України; та правових органів, таких як Міністерство юстиції, Генеральна прокуратура та система місцевих судів.

Примітка 6. Серед них 7 латвійців працюють в КМЄС з липня 2019 р. (див.: https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/news/latest-news/63867-latvia-increases-the-number-of-its-civilian-experts-on-the-eu-advisory-mission-in-ukraine).

Примітка 7. Серед спільних досягнень Місія згадує законодавчу підтримку 40 законопроектів, розроблення 25 стратегічних документів, ознайомлення та впровадження підходу громадської поліції, навчальних програм для Національної поліції, запровадження текам швидкого реагування, запровадження оцінки серйозної та організованої злочинности (SOCTA) програма, підтримка центрів адміністративного обслуговування МВС, доставка обладнання на суму 3,2 млн євро та багато іншого (див.: http://www.euam-ukraine.eu/our-mission/progress-in-reform/).

Примітка 8. Інтерв'ю авторів з дипломатом EUAM 28.05. 2019.

Примітка 9. Так звана формула Штайнмаєра (пропозиція Франка-Вальтера Штайнмаєра, президента Німеччини) вже викликає різноманітні реакції на міжнародному та внутрішньому рівні, ставлячи під сумнів, чи Зеленський не капітулював перед Москвою, надсилаючи позитивні коментарі щодо цієї пропозиції.

Notes

Note 1. The article focuses on EU's engagement in civilian security sector reform after 2014. However, the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine is present in Ukraine since 2005 and was extended five times.

Note 2. Other three Eastern Partnership countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus do not fall into kategory of countries striving for EU membership.

Note 3. More on country views before the Vilius summit: Latvijas intereses Eiropas Savienībā. 2013(3). Retrieved 28 September 2019. https://www.mfa.gov.lv/images/uploads/ES_3_2013_makets%20netam.pdf.

Note 4. In September 2019 the EU implements 16 missions and operations world wide and 5000 personel is employed.

Note 5. In Ukraine's case those agents are the Ministry of Internal Affairs, National Police, State Border Guard Service, National Anti-Corruption Bureau and Security Service of Ukraine; and rule of law agencies such as the Ministry of Justice, General Prosecutor's Office, and local courts system.

Note 6. Among them 7 Latvians are working in the EUAM since July 2019. https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/news/latest-news/63867-latvia-increases-the-number-of-its-civilian-experts-on-the-eu-advisory-mission-in-ukraine.

Note 7. Among the joint achievements the Mission mentions legislative support to 40 draft laws, drafting of 25 strategic documents, familiarizing and introducing community policing approach, training programmes for National Police, launch of quick response tekams, introduction of a Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) programme, support for MoIA administrative service centres, delivery of equipment worth EUR 3.2 million, and many other (http://www.euam-ukraine.eu/our-mission/progress-in-reform/).

Note 8. Interview of the authors with the EUAM diplomat on 28 May 2019.

Note 9. So-called Steinmeier Formula (proposal of Frank-Walter Steinmeier, President of Germany) is already causing diverse reactions internationaly and domesticly, questioning whether Zelensky has not capitulated to Moscow by sending positive comments regarding the proposal.

Подано до редакції 27. 10. 2019 р.

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ВКЛАД ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СОЮЗА В РЕФОРМУ ГРАЖДАНСКОГО СЕКТОРА БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ В УКРАИНЕ ПОСЛЕ 2014 ГОДА

Аннотация. В статье рассмотрено как Общая политика безопасности и обороны Европейского Союза способствует миру и стабильности в Украине. Начиная с 2014 года, после Евромайдана и его требований к европеизации страны, ЕС и другие международные организации помогают Украине в ее модернизационных усилиях. Распространение жестокого военного конфликта на Востоке Украины требовало многостороннего привлечения стратегических партнеров в трансформации секторов безопасности и обороны, а также активного участия в управлении конфликтами в восточной части страны. ЕС участвовал в различных инициативах, предлагаемых государствами-членами, Сообществом и Украиной. Исследователи анализируют были ли использованы те инструменты, которые составляют суть ОПБО (Общая политика безопасности и обороны), и насколько выгодны эти усилия для Украины. Также определино, какие инициативы ОПБО могут способствовать трансформации сектора безопасности в Украине и какие основные коммуникационные каналы используются для объяснения реформ.

Сотрудничество Украины с ЕС рассмотрено в историческом контексте. Авторы обращают внимание на то, что первые механизмы для сотрудничества с бывшими республиками Советского Союза Европейский Союз предложил еще в 1994 г. Речь идет о программах «ТАСИС» и «TEMPUS», которые Украина использовала частично. Рассмотрены также сотрудничество Украины с ЕС в рамках Консультативной миссии Европейского Союза в Украине, целью которой было содействие трансформации сектора гражданской безопасности.

Статья приводит краткий обзор инструментов, которыми ЕС располагает для сотрудничества с другими странами в секторе гражданской безопасности. Рассмотрены результаты работы ЕС в Украине после 2014 года, когда Консультативная миссия Европейского Союза в Украине начала действовать.

Ключевые слова: *Общая политика безопасности и обороны, Европейский Союз, Консультативная миссия Европейского Союза, реформа сектора безопасности, стабилизационные усилия.*